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or, the Subject of What Is Sex? 
 
Russell Sbriglia  
Though there are a number of reasons as to why Alenka Zupančič’’s What Is Sex? is a 
crucial intervention into the fields of contemporary philosophy and psychoanalysis, 
perhaps none is more crucial, given the current “ontological turn” in critical theory, 
than its trenchant defense of the necessity of retaining the category of the subject for 
any ontology that aims to be truly realist or materialist. Proceeding from this premise, 
in what follows I will be focusing exclusively on what is by far the book’s longest, 
most complex chapter — one that comprises its entire second half — “Object-
Disoriented Ontology.” The first section of the essay consists of a brief overview of 
Zupančič’s Lacanian rejoinder to the various “new”/“speculative” realisms and 
materialisms currently seeking to demote and thereby (intentionally or not) expunge 
the subject from ontology — a rejoinder grounded upon an insistence not merely on 
the subject’s continued relevance for, but its indispensability to — indeed, its very 
ineradicability from — properly realist/materialist inquiry. From here, the second and 
third sections aim to supplement Zupančič’s position by examining the ways in which 
the tenets of this “Real ontology,” as I term it, are borne out by a third field — one that, 
as it so often does in Lacan’s own work, helps to suture the two fields that claim the 
majority of Zupančič’s attention throughout What Is Sex?, philosophy and 
psychoanalysis: literature. Taking Zupančič’s focus on the death drive throughout 
“Object-Disoriented Ontology” as my starting point, I look in particular at Herman 
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Melville’s Moby-Dick, a novel whose tragic Captain Ahab offers a prime illustration of 
the role that the death drive plays in rendering material reality “not-all,” ontologically 
incomplete. Section two begins by doubling back from drive to desire, the latter of 
which is exemplified by the “intangible malignity” and “inscrutable malice” that Ahab 
anamorphically ascribes to Moby Dick; it ends by considering the point at which 
desire crosses into — opens a path onto — drive: the point of “pure desire,” a point 
exemplified by the figure of Fedallah, the diabolical fourth harpooner of Ahab’s crew 
who is born of Ahab’s dreams. The third and final section looks more closely at how 
Fedallah, the surplus-enjoyment produced by pure desire, functions as a literal 
embodiment of the excessive materiality of the drive. In so using Moby-Dick as a 
means of attending to the impossible matter generated by the drive’s insistence, my 
primary aim is to not merely corroborate, but to strengthen — to “double-down” on, 
as it were — the rationale behind Zupančič’s own insistence on the impossibility of 
eliminating the subject from materialist thought.  
 
Ontology’s Real Subject 
 Let me begin by rehearsing the case that Zupančič makes for a Lacanian 
realism/materialism in the book’s lengthy final chapter, “Object-Disoriented 
Ontology.” Of particular importance here are two of the chapter’s six sections: 
“Realism in Psychoanalysis” and “Death Drive II: Lacan and Deleuze.” The former 
consists primarily of an engagement with Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude — the 
ur-text of so-called “speculative realism” — in which Zupančič focuses on 
Meillassoux’s recourse to the concept of the “arche-fossil” as a means of exposing 
the limits of what he terms “correlationism.”1 As Meillassoux defines it, correlationism 
is the idea — an idea, he maintains, that underwrites virtually all post-Kantian 
philosophy — “according to which we only ever have access to the correlation 
between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the 
other” — the idea, in other words, that it is “[im]possible to consider the realms of 
subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another.”2 For Meillassoux, arche-
fossils — objects that antedate the advent of human beings (e.g., dinosaur fossils) — 
demonstrate the limits to the correlationist approach insofar as they confront us with 
the existence of matter prior to, and thus altogether outside of, human thought.3 In so 
doing, they prove that we can, in fact, access being in-itself, that we can recover “the 
great outdoors,” the “absolute outside of pre-critical [i.e., pre-Kantian] thinkers.”4 
Given Zupančič’s groundbreaking work on the relation between Kant and 
Lacan in her earlier Ethics of the Real, that she felt compelled in What Is Sex? to 
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respond to Meillassoux’s critique of the “Kantian catastrophe” (as he more pointedly 
characterizes correlationism toward the end of After Finitude) should come as no 
surprise.5 She begins her rejoinder by noting that, from the Lacanian perspective, 
Meillassoux’s speculative realism/materialism — a realism/materialism that, much to 
Zupančič’s surprise, depends largely on “a straightforward belief that the nature 
which [science] describes is absolute and exists ‘out there,’ independently of us” — is 
not truly realist/materialist.6 Turning to Lacan himself, Zupančič cites the following 
comments regarding “the realist argument” in Seminar XVI, D’un Autre à l’autre: “We 
cannot resist the idea that nature is always there, whether we are there or not, we 
and our science, as if science were indeed ours and we weren’t determined by it. Of 
course I won’t dispute this. Nature is there.” And yet, Lacan concludes, “To be a 
philosopher of nature has never been considered as a proof of materialism, nor of 
scientific quality.”7 What this means, Zupančič explains, is that for Lacan:  
  
materialism is not guaranteed by any matter. It is not the reference to matter 
as the ultimate substance from which all emerges (and which, in this 
conceptual perspective, is often highly spiritualized) that leads to true 
materialism. The true materialism, which — as Lacan puts it with trenchant 
directness in another significant passage — can only be a dialectical 
materialism, is not grounded in the primacy of matter nor in matter as first 
principle, but in the notion of conflict or contradiction, of split, and of the 
“parallax of the Real” produced in it. In other words, the fundamental axiom of 
materialism is not “matter is all” or “matter is primary,” but relates rather to the 
primacy of a cut. And, of course, this is not without consequences for the kind 
of realism that pertains to this materialism.8 
 
From this Lacanian perspective, Zupančič concludes, “The reality of arche-fossils . . . 
is no different from the reality of objects contemporary with us . . . because neither 
the former nor the latter are correlates of our thinking, but are instead objective 
correlates of the emergence of a break in reality as a homogeneous continuum.”9 
The name for this break in reality, this notion of conflict, contradiction, or split that 
produces a “parallax of the Real” — a break or split which entails that the proper 
axiom of materialism is not “material reality is all there is,” but rather, as Slavoj Žižek 
often puts it, invoking the Lacanian logic of sexuation, “material reality is non-all” — is, 
Zupančič concludes, the subject.10 
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 Zupančič waits, however, to develop this point until considerably later in the 
chapter, in the aforementioned section on Lacan, Deleuze, and the death drive. 
Though she begins this section by attending to some of the overlooked resonances 
between Lacan and Deleuze — the most notable of these being that both thinkers 
reject the typical dualistic understanding of the Freudian drives (according to which 
Eros and Thanatos, the “life drives” and the death drive, are viewed as competing, 
opposed principles) and insist instead on “the primacy of the death drive” — she 
concludes it by focusing on the point at which the two are fundamentally 
incompatible: the question of the subject.11 As Zupančič explains, “whereas Deleuze’s 
‘realism’ implies radical desubjectivation, for Lacan (the effect of) subjectivation is the 
very instance (or ‘proof’) of an irreducible Real.”12 In short, the difference between 
what Deleuze calls “realized Ontology” and what we might call Lacan’s “Real 
ontology” hinges, above all, on the role that subjectivity plays — or doesn’t play — in 
each.13 
If the many “new”/“speculative” materialisms and realisms currently en vogue 
across the humanities (e.g., speculative realism, object-oriented ontology, New 
Materialism) are any indication, Deleuze’s “realized Ontology” is currently winning the 
battle for the future of materialism. Whatever the differences between these various 
materialisms and realisms — and there are indeed differences between them —
Zupančič is entirely correct when she claims that all of them share the dual aim of 
“‘getting out of the subject’ (the supposed discursive or transcendental cage) and . . . 
‘getting the subject out’ (of the landscape of new ontologies).”14 Such being the case, 
it is no stretch to say that the most fundamental question Zupančič poses throughout 
this entire chapter, the question whose stakes are the highest — not only for 
psychoanalysis’ continued relevance to and purchase on future materialist thinking, 
but, indeed, for the future of materialist thinking in general — is the following one: 
“Can there be a serious materialism without the subject — that is, without a strong 
concept of the subject?”15  
The answer to this question is, quite simply, no. What is not so simple, 
however, is the reason why this is the case. For starters, as Zupančič points out, the 
very framing of the debate concerning the role of the subject in materialist 
philosophy is incorrect, premised on a false opposition. From the Lacanian 
standpoint, materialism “is precisely not based on the opposition between ‘naked’ 
reality, stripped of all subjective illusions and investments (reality such as it exists 
independently of the subject), and an ‘always-already’ subjective/subjectivized (or 
subject-constituted) reality.”16 Though Lacanians do indeed hold that “reality as it is 
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independently of ourselves appears (comes into view) only ‘dependently on us’ as 
subjects,” this is meant “not in the sense of [reality] being caused or constituted by 
us” — as in, say, Berkeleyan idealism, the (in)famous maxim of which is “esse est 
percipi” — but rather “in the sense that reality’s own inherent negativity/ contradiction 
appears as part of this reality precisely in the form of the subject.” This is absolutely 
crucial: the subject is not a mega-actant that posits/constructs material reality; rather, 
the subject is “an objective embodiment of reality’s contradiction,” of the fact that 
being in-itself is contradictory, riven by antagonism.17 This is why “the gist of Lacan’s 
materialism,” as Zupančič articulates it, is as follows:  
 
…of course I am determined, as a subject, by things that exist independently of 
me; yet the subjective position, or subjectivation, is not only a concrete and 
singular way in which things determine me, it is also and at the same time the 
subjectivation of a paradox/contradiction involved in the very things that 
determine me (this paradox/contradiction exists “in itself” only as this 
objectivation-subjectivation, or objectivation via the subject).18  
 
In short, “we get to certain aspects of objective reality only by insisting on the 
irreducibility of the subject.”19 
And this is why, to take object-oriented ontology and New Materialism as 
prime examples, neither the “hasty, precipitate objectivation of the subject” 
characteristic of the former, nor the “bracketing” or “eliding” of questions of 
subjectivity characteristic of the latter, are properly materialist maneuvers.20 If we 
could simply “‘horizontaliz[e]’ . . . the ontological plane” (as Jane Bennett’s New 
Materialism aims to do), thereby rendering the subject merely “one object among 
many others,” one object “among the various types of objects that exist or populate 
the world, each with their own specific powers and capacities” (as Levi Bryant’s 
object-oriented ontology aims to do), then “there would be no need for the concept 
of the subject (in the strong philosophical and psychoanalytic sense); the term 
‘person’ (or ‘human being’) would suffice.”21 Hence Žižek’s insistence that what object-
oriented ontologists and New Materialists call subject “simply does not meet the 
criteria of subject.”22 As Zupančič elaborates, that “the subject names an object that is 
precisely not just an object among others” is “the whole point.” The subject “is not 
simply an object among many objects, it is also the form of existence of the 
contradiction, antagonism, at work in the very existence of objects as objects... The 
subject exists among objects, yet it exists there as the point that gives access to a 
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possible objectivation of their inner antagonism, its inscription into their reality.” And 
here we arrive at why the subject is both inextricable from and indispensable to 
Lacanian materialism: the subject is “not simply the one who thinks,” but who, above 
all, “makes certain contradictions accessible to thought,” the one through which 
“these contradictions [in being] appear as a ‘matter of thought.’”23 Subtract the “‘matter 
of thought’” that is the subject, and “it is difficult to speak of materialism.”24 Lacanian 
materialism, then, is “thinking which advances as thinking of contradictions,” and 
“what makes psychoanalysis a materialist theory (and practice)” is that “it starts by 
thinking a problem/difficulty/contradiction, not by trying to think the world such as it 
is independently of the subject.”25 
To thus reframe the debate: though often mistaken for merely another iteration 
of correlationism, the Lacanian insistence upon the subject is anything but. For 
contrary to the correlationist position, Lacan neither places the subject squarely on 
the side of epistemology nor equates the subject’s ontology, its being, with thinking. 
Rather, as Zupančič clarifies, the Lacanian subject, as “subject of the unconscious,” is 
located at — or, more strongly, functions as — the “‘short circuit’ of the 
epistemological and ontological levels (of knowledge and being) in the form of their 
joint/common negativity (lack of knowledge falls into a lack of being).”26 In short, the 
subject stands for the radical negativity, the radical out-of-jointness, of reality (in) 
itself, the hole in reality that renders being unwhole, disoriented — or, even better, like 
the topological figures Lacan was so fond of invoking (the torus, Möbius strip, cross-
cap, Klein bottle, etc.), non-orientable.27 
 
From Drive to Desire 
 In a very significant sense, then, the subject is indeed, as the practitioners of 
the various new/speculative materialisms and realisms addressed above claim, an 
object. Yet it is a very particular, very peculiar kind of object — a strange object that, 
insofar as it is in the subject more than the subject itself, is constitutive of subjectivity 
as such. This object is that which Lacan termed objet petit a (object small a), the 
“object-cause of desire,” the “extimate” object-in-subject that operates as an 
incursion — a “cut,” as Lacan likes to put it — of the Real into the fabric of reality that 
is nonetheless responsible for maintaining the consistency of reality, a recalcitrant 
little piece of the Real that resists symbolization/ assimilation into reality yet which for 
that very reason sets the process of reality’s symbolization in motion.28 
Given the crucial role that the objet a plays in Lacanian ontology, it is 
somewhat surprising that it is virtually absent from What Is Sex? The term appears 
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only twice in the text — once in the body, once in an endnote — both instances of 
which occur in the final chapter I have been discussing. I point this out not to critique 
Zupančič’s book, but to use it as an opportunity to delve more deeply into the relation 
between desire and drive relative to Lacanian ontology and to ask how that relation 
can be used to further distinguish the object-disoriented ontology of psychoanalytic 
materialism from the object-oriented ontology of the many aforementioned 
new/speculative materialisms and realisms. To that end, I would like to bring a third 
field to bear on philosophy and psychoanalysis, the two fields that ground much 
ofZupančič’s thinking throughout What Is Sex?: literature.29  
In “Human, Animal,” the second section of “Object-Disoriented Ontology,” 
Zupančič cites the following lines from one of Hamlet’s many famous soliloquies: 
 
To die, to sleep — 
 No more, and by a sleep to say we end 
 The heartache and the thousand natural shocks 
 That flesh is heir to — ’tis a consummation 
 Devoutly to be wished. To die, to sleep. 
 To sleep, perchance to dream. Ay, there’s the rub, 
 For in that sleep of death what dreams may come 
 When we have shuffled off this mortal coil 
 Must give us pause. There’s the respect 
 That makes calamity of so long life.30 
 
As Zupančič glosses this passage: 
 
What constitutes the problem, makes us twitch and hesitate, is not (the 
thought of) death, but (the thought of) that which — in the same way as it 
haunts us in the sleep of life — might haunt us in our sleep of death. What 
scares us is that even in the sleep of death something might come and disturb 
us, haunt us, and would not let us (not) be.31  
 
This, of course, is the position in which Hamlet’s father, the Ghost, finds himself as a 
result of being murdered “in the blossoms of [his] sin,” with “No reck’ning made” and 
thus “With all [his] imperfections on [his] head.”32 As he tells Hamlet, not only is he 
“Doomed for a certain term to walk the night,” but, what is worse, he is also doomed 
to spend his days “confined to fast in fires / Till the foul crimes done in [his] days of 
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nature / Are burnt and purged away” — a suffering that, could the “lightest word” of it 
be told to Hamlet, “Would harrow up [his] soul, freeze [his] young blood, / Make [his] 
two eyes like stars start from their spheres, / [His] knotty and combined locks to part, 
/ And each particular hair to stand on end / Like quills upon the fretful porcupine.”33 
This “undead” status of Hamlet’s father brings Zupančič to the death drive, a concept, 
she explains, which, contrary to the superficial understanding of it, “is not so much 
something that aims at death as a strange deviation from the supposed homeostasis 
of death itself.”34 Yet we might recall that in Seminar VI, Le désir et son interprétation, 
Lacan reads Hamlet as a tragedy not of drive, but of desire.35  
In this early excursion into the nature of what, at this point in his thinking, 
Lacan characterized as the “object in desire” (it wouldn’t become the “object-cause 
of desire” until later on), the objet a is that which “takes the place . . . of what the 
subject is — symbolically — deprived of[:] . . . [t]he phallus; and it is from the phallus 
that the object gets its function in the fantasy, and from the phallus that desire is 
constituted with the fantasy as its reference.”36 As he continues, “Something becomes 
an object in desire when it takes the place of what by its very nature remains 
concealed from the subject: that self-sacrifice, that pound of flesh which is 
mortgaged [engagé] in his relationship to the signifier.”37 In the case of Hamlet, the 
objet a, one that he both desublimates and resublimates over the course of the play, 
is Ophelia — a point no better exemplified than by Lacan’s admittedly “gross” pun 
that “Ophelia is O phallos.”38 Yet what gives rise to the need for the (fantasmatic) 
phallic substitute in the first place is the (symbolic) loss of the phallus termed 
castration.   
While there is a good deal to be said about the functioning of the phallus 
throughout Hamlet — and, indeed, Lacan himself says quite a bit about it, with 
regard not only to Ophelia, but to Claudius and Gertrude as well — when it comes to 
castration an even better tragedy of desire is Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick. Having 
on a previous voyage been “dismasted” by the legendary White Whale, the 
eponymous Moby Dick, the monomaniacal Captain Ahab dedicates his entire life to 
the quest for vengeance against (in the words of Starbuck, the Pequod’s first mate) 
the “dumb brute.”39 Yet, that Moby Dick is for Ahab not merely a dumb brute, “a dumb 
thing” that “smote [him] from blindest instinct” (to again quote Starbuck), but is, 
rather, a “monomaniac incarnation of all those malicious agencies which some deep 
men feel eating in them, till they are left living on with half a heart and half a lung,” is 
precisely why he is so madly pledged to chase him “round Good Hope, and round 
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the Horn, and round the Norway Maelstrom, and round perdition’s flames . . . till he 
spouts black blood and rolls fin out.”40  
As these passages suggest, Ahab, as I have discussed elsewhere, provides a 
textbook illustration of the logic of sublimation, whereby, as Lacan defines it in 
Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, one “raises an object . . . to the dignity of 
the Thing.”41 Ahab’s anamorphic projection of an “inscrutable malice,” an “intangible 
malignity,” onto Moby Dick elevates what to Starbuck is merely “a dumb thing” to the 
dignity of the Thing.42 To be sure, Moby Dick is indeed sublime in the standard 
Burkean and Kantian senses of the term. Yet, for Ahab he is sublime not on account 
of his snow white grandeur, but on account of the unfathomable, intangible 
something he sees in him (his “inscrutable malice”) as a result of a gaze distorted by 
desire, jaundiced by hatred.43 Here, however, in light of Zupančič’s focus on the death 
drive throughout “Object-Disoriented Ontology,” I would like to focus on a different 
object born of Ahab’s desire, one born not, as in the case of Moby Dick’s “intangible 
malignity,” of Ahab’s oft-remarked monomaniacal desire — a form of desire that, 
insofar as it is “object-oriented,” Kant would deem “pathological” — but of what 
Lacan, in his discussion of Antigone in Seminar VII, terms “pure desire,” that form of 
desire which, as Zupančič argues in Ethics of the Real, leads us “beyond desire” into 
the realm of the drive.44 That object is Fedallah, the Mephistophelean leader of Ahab’s 
mysterious crew of Parsee stowaways.  
As Leslie Fiedler long ago pointed out in his Love and Death in the American 
Novel, Ahab’s relationship with Fedallah can best be characterized as an American 
version of the “Faustian bargain” in which Fedallah “plays Satan to Ahab’s Faust.”45 
Much is made about Fedallah’s supposedly diabolical nature throughout the novel. 
Consider, for instance, the following discussion between Stubb and Flask — the 
Pequod’s second and third mates, respectively — concerning “that gamboge ghost 
of a Fedallah” (as Flask refers to him). In response to Flask’s concern that Fedallah 
will “charm the ship to no good at last,” Stubb replies:   
 
Flask, I take that Fedallah to be the devil in disguise. Do you believe that cock 
and bull story about his having been stowed away on board ship? He’s the 
devil, I say. The reason why you don’t see his tail, is because he tucks it up out 
of sight; he carries it coiled away in his pocket, I guess.46  
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As if to lend further credence to these conjectures, Ishmael concludes the chapter 
with the following tableau of Fedallah inspecting the head of a right whale the crew 
has killed and hoisted alongside the ship:  
 
Fedallah was calmly eyeing the right whale’s head, and ever and anon 
glancing from the deep wrinkles there to the lines in his own hand. And Ahab 
chanced so to stand, that the Parsee occupied his shadow; while, if the 
Parsee’s shadow was there at all it seemed only to blend with it, and lengthen 
Ahab’s.47  
 
Passages such as these, of which there are many more throughout the novel, speak 
to Fiedler’s point that “the whole relationship of Ahab to Fedallah is rendered in 
precisely so artificial and unconvincing a mode” — a result of Melville’s reliance on 
“the cheapjack machinery of the gothic novel” — that the “modern reader” is tempted 
to read it as an attempt by Melville to “undercut ironically the whole Faustian myth.”48 
And yet, as Fiedler is nonetheless forced to query, if this is indeed the case, if we are 
indeed to take Ahab’s Faustian bargain with Fedallah only half-seriously, then “why is 
Fedallah in the action to begin with, and why do his Macbethian predictions” — 
namely, that before Ahab can die, “two hearses must verily be seen by [him] on the 
sea,” the first “not made by mortal hands,” the second made of wood “grown in 
America”; that “neither hearse nor coffin can be [Ahab’s],” for “hemp only can kill 
[him]”; and, finally, that he, Fedallah, Ahab’s “pilot,” must die before him — “so 
precisely and tantalizingly come true?”49 
 The more proper question to ask, however, is not why Fedallah is in the action 
to begin with, but rather how he comes to be in it. Stubb may encourage his men to 
“never mind from where” Fedallah and his fellow “brimstone . . . devils” came, but as 
Ishmael tells us, “all manner of wild conjectures” and “Laplandish speculations” 
persist among the crew concerning the nature of these “outlandish strangers,” 
especially as regards “dark Ahab’s precise agency in the matter.”50 It won’t do to say 
that, like Moby Dick’s malignity, the diabolical Fedallah is an anamorphic stain, a 
specter born of a desiring gaze that, to invoke the most famous of literary 
anamorphoses, Queen Isabel’s “looking awry” upon King Richard’s departure in 
Richard II, generates “naught but shadows / Of what is not.”51 On the contrary, 
Fedallah and the rest of Ahab’s “tiger-yellow crew” of stowaways really do exist.52 
When, before setting sail, the “cracked” prophet Elijah asks Ishmael whether he saw 
“anything looking like men going towards th[e] ship a while ago,” Ishmael answers, 
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“Yes, I thought I did see four or five men; but it was too dim to be sure.”53 Reflecting 
further on the incident, Ishmael confesses that he “would have thought [him]self to 
have been optically deceived in the matter, were it not for Elijah’s otherwise 
inexplicable question.”54 Though Ishmael “beat[s] the thing down” for the time being, it 
returns in chapter 43, “Hark!” — one of a handful of chapters from which Ishmael, 
notably, is entirely absent — in which a minor character named Archy tells another 
minor character, Cabaco, that he thinks he hears a cough in the hold of the ship, 
adding that he heard Stubb and Flask talking about  
“something of that sort” on a previous morning watch.55 
 And yet, for all this empirical evidence of Fedallah and company’s existence 
prior to their first full-fledged appearance in chapter 48, “The First Lowering,” neither 
will it do to simply dismiss Stubb’s dismissal of the stowaway explanation as a “cock 
and bull story” — a dismissal that hinges on his conviction that Fedallah is the 
(proverbially Faustian) “devil in disguise.” From this perspective, perhaps the most 
crucial passage with regard to how Fedallah came to be is the following one, in 
which Ishmael describes Ahab’s nightly outbursts from his cabin:  
 
Often, when forced from his hammock by exhausting and intolerably vivid 
dreams of the night, which, resuming his own intense thoughts through the 
day, carried them on amid a clashing of phrensies, and whirled them round 
and round in his blazing brain, till the very throbbing of his life-spot became 
insufferable anguish; and when, as was sometimes the case, these spiritual 
throes in him heaved his being up from its base, and a chasm seemed 
opening to him, from which forked flames and lightnings shot up, and 
accursed fiends beckoned him to leap down among them; when this hell in 
himself yawned beneath him, a wild cry would be heard through the ship; and 
with glaring eyes Ahab would burst from his state room, as though escaping 
from a bed that was on fire. Yet these, perhaps, instead of being the 
unsuppressable symptoms of some latent weakness, or fright at his own 
resolve, were but the plainest tokens of its intensity. For, at such times, crazy 
Ahab, the scheming, unappeasedly steadfast hunter of the white whale; this 
Ahab that had gone to his hammock, was not the agent that so caused him to 
burst from it in horror again. The latter was the eternal, living principle or soul 
in him; and in sleep, being for the time dissociated from the characterizing 
mind, which at other times employed it for its outer vehicle or agent, it 
spontaneously sought escape from the scorching contiguity of the frantic 
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thing, of which, for the time, it was no longer an integral. But as the mind does 
not exist unless leagued with the soul, therefore it must have been that, in 
Ahab’s case, yielding up all his thoughts and fancies to his one supreme 
purpose; that purpose, by its own sheer inveteracy of will, forced itself against 
gods and devils into a kind of self-assumed, independent being of its own. 
Nay, could grimly live and burn, while the common vitality to which it was 
conjoined, fled horror-stricken from the unbidden and unfathered birth. 
Therefore, the tormented spirit that glared out of bodily eyes, when what 
seemed Ahab rushed from his room, was for the time but a vacated thing, a 
formless somnambulistic being, a ray of living light, to be sure, but without an 
object to color, and therefore a blankness in itself. God help thee, old man, thy 
thoughts have created a creature in thee; and he whose intense thinking thus 
makes him a Prometheus; a vulture feeds upon that heart for ever; that vulture 
the very creature he creates.56 
 
This passage entirely justifies the crew’s engagement in “wild conjectures as to dark 
Ahab’s precise agency in the matter,” for it depicts how Fedallah, as Sharon Cameron 
wonderfully puts it, is a being born “out of Ahab’s mind,” a man “birthed in Ahab’s 
dreams and seen by the eyes of the Pequod’s crew.”57 Yet he is a being born not of 
Ahab’s conscious, “characterizing mind,” but of his unconscious. For in an inversion 
of Hamlet’s fear of what hellish dreams may come after death, Melville here shows 
us what hellish figures may come of dreams generated by the death drive.  
What is crucial to note here is that this scene of Fedallah’s genesis out of 
Ahab’s dreams in no way conflicts with the fact that he and his fellow “dusky 
phantoms” existed prior to them.58 As discussed above, with Fedallah and company’s 
first definitive appearance in “The First Lowering,” we learn that Ishmael (and Elijah) 
did, in fact, see them boarding the ship, that Archy did, in fact, hear them in the hold. 
From the literary perspective, these incidents are, of course, instances of 
foreshadowing. From the psychoanalytic perspective, however — especially a 
materialist psychoanalytic perspective — Ahab’s dream, which comes a mere three 
chapters before Fedallah and his cohort first appear, is far more important, for it 
functions as a key instance of Nachträglichkeit, of “afterwardsness,” in which 
Fedallah’s birth, paradoxically, occurs retroactively, after the fact.59 To again invoke 
Hamlet, with respect to Fedallah’s birth — his causation, as it were — “The time is out 
of joint.”60 And this “unbidden and unfathered birth,” this creation of Fedallah ex nihilo 
out of Ahab’s dreams, is precisely the type of being for which a “flat,” “horizontal” 
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ontology — one in which not only are subjects merely one type of object among 
many other objects (which, as addressed earlier, amounts to a subjectless ontology), 
but so too are all objects (including subjects) entirely “withdrawn” from one another 
— simply cannot account.61 Though not a Lacanian, the aforementioned Cameron 
provides an uncannily Lacanian analysis of the extimate nature of Fedallah when she 
writes that “Melville means us to see [Fedallah] as problematically at once inside and 
outside of [Ahab],” “that part of himself which exists outside himself.”62 Only a 
materialism that understands Fedallah as an object dialectically begotten by the 
pure desire of the subject of the unconscious — “pure” being the operative word here 
— can properly account for his extimate, Möbial nature. 
 
From Desire to Drive 
 As mentioned above, What Is Sex? is more concerned with drive than desire, 
the difference between these concepts having garnered much Lacanian ink. Todd 
McGowan best represents the distinction commonly drawn between the two when 
he explains that whereas “desire is predicated on the belief that it is possible to 
regain the lost object and thereby discover the ultimate enjoyment,” drive “locates 
enjoyment in the movement of return itself — the repetition of loss, rather than in 
what might be recovered.”63 In short, in contrast to desire, the drive, as Zupančič 
herself puts it in Ethics of the Real, “attain[s] its satisfaction without attaining its goal.”64 
And yet, as Zupančič elaborates, even if desire and drive share no “common 
measure,” no common aim or goal, one cannot “arrive at the drive” without “pass[ing] 
through desire and insist[ing] on it until the very end,” for it is only by “follow[ing] the 
‘logic’ of desire to its limit” that “a possible passage opens up towards the drive.”65 To 
insist on desire until the very end, until we reach its limit — another way of 
articulating what Lacan ultimately claims is the “ethics of psychoanalysis,” to not give 
ground relative to one’s desire — is to arrive at “pure desire,” desire purified of any 
object, any pathological content.66 Pure desire opens up a path to the drive because, 
as Lacan stresses in Seminar XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 
“As far as the object in the drive is concerned, . . . it is, strictly speaking, of no 
importance. It is a matter of total indifference.”67 The drive may be said to have an 
aim, a goal — namely, its own satisfaction — but it is not, strictly speaking, object-
oriented. Another way of putting this would be to say that there is no object of the 
drive, only objects generated by the drive — the partial objects (gaze, voice, breast, 
phallus, feces) that Lacan identified as objets petit a — and these extimate objects, 
once again, are precisely those for which the flat, subjectless ontologies of the 
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avowedly “non-dialectical” new/speculative materialisms and realisms addressed 
above cannot account.68  
 Instructive here is the concept of “perversity” theorized by Melville’s 
contemporary, Edgar Allan Poe. As defined in “The Imp of the Perverse,” perversity is 
“an innate and primitive impulse of human action,” “a radical, a primitive impulse, 
elementary.”69 We find a similar definition in another of Poe’s tales of perversity, “The 
Black Cat,” wherein perversity is said to be “one of the primitive impulses of the 
human heart — one of the indivisible primary faculties, or sentiments, which give 
direction to the character of Man.”70 Perversity is “radical” in a dual sense: it is not only 
“a mobile without motive — a motive not motivirt,” an impulse “[t]hrough [whose] 
promptings we act without comprehensible object,” but also a “strongly 
antagonistical sentiment” that “arouse[s]” not a “desire to be well,” but an 
“unfathomable longing of the soul to vex itself — to offer violence to its own nature,” 
an “anomalous feeling” which, “were it not occasionally known to operate in 
furtherance of good, we might deem . . . a direct instigation of the Arch-fiend.”71 “Nor,” 
Poe’s narrator concludes, “will this overwhelming tendency . . . admit of analysis, or 
resolution into ulterior elements,” for “[b]eyond or behind this [‘spirit of the Perverse’] 
there is no principle that men, in their fleshly nature, can understand.”72  
 Consult Beyond the Pleasure Principle and you will see just how uncannily 
Poe anticipates Freud — or just how uncannily Freud, in this discourse on the 
compulsion to repeat, repeats Poe. Consider, for instance, Freud’s definition of the 
death drive as “a compulsion to repeat . . . more primitive, more elementary, more 
instinctual than the pleasure principle” and the “self-preservative instincts,” both of 
which it “over-rides” and “act[s] in opposition to,” thereby “giv[ing] the appearance of 
some ‘daemonic’ force at work,” the “hint of possession by some ‘daemonic’ power.”73 
Were one to silently insert these passages into Poe’s tales of perversity — or vice 
versa — readers would be hard-pressed to notice the interpolation. And yet, 
anticipating Lacan, Poe at the same time goes beyond Freud, for in the figure of the 
imp of the perverse — “a dusky, fiendish, and filmy figure” with “a shrill-sounding and 
phantom voice,” as the eponymous hero of The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym 
describes the imp of the perverse that, in one of the most harrowing scenes of the 
novel, beckons him to achieve “ultimate escape” by releasing his hold of the rocks to 
which he desperately clings while dangling over the edge of a precipice — Poe 
materializes — that is, objectivizes — the “‘daemonic’ force” produced by the drive.74 
Melville’s Fedallah is one of these imps of the perverse, an “accursed fiend” born of 
the hellish “chasm” opened in Ahab by the “nightmare of the soul” that is the death 
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drive.75 In “heav[ing Ahab’s] being up from its base,” the death drive gives birth to an 
altogether different sort of being, an extimate object-in-subject whose existence, 
insofar as it lies not only beyond the pleasure principle, but beyond the reality 
principle as well, rends reality, rendering it not-all, incomplete. 
It is in this shift of focus from Moby Dick as the impossible object-cause of 
Ahab’s monomaniacal desire to Fedallah as the excessive, excremental object 
produced by the pure desire of the drive that we can come to understand what 
Zupančič (again in Ethics of the Real) identifies as the change that “the ‘ontological’ 
status of enjoyment underwent” in the later Lacan.76 Whereas for the earlier Lacan — 
the Lacan who reads Hamlet in Seminar VI, for instance — the trouble with 
jouissance is that it does not exist, is unattainable, always eludes our grasp,77 for the 
later Lacan, the trouble with jouissance, as Žižek explains, is that “one can never get 
rid of it, that its stain drags along for ever.”78 Yet, as the impish Fedallah demonstrates, 
it is less the case that this stain is forever dragged along by the subject than that the 
subject is forever dragged along by this stain. And it is in this precise sense that 
Fedallah is Ahab’s “pilot.” Moby Dick’s intangible malignity may be the object-cause 
of desire that sets Ahab down the “iron way,” but Fedallah is the jouissance of the 
drive that fuels the train’s engine.79  
 This is why all of Ahab’s dreams of throwing off his “[c]ursed . . . mortal inter-
indebtedness” — be it his indebtedness to the crew on which he is forced to rely in 
order to exact his revenge (including the “blockhead” of a carpenter to whom he is 
beholden to make him a new ivory leg after his first one shatters), or his 
indebtedness to his own body (“I would be free as air; and I’m down in the whole 
world’s books. I am so rich, I could have given bid for bid with the wealthiest 
Praetorians at the auction of the Roman empire . . . and yet I owe for the flesh in the 
tongue I brag with”) — are just as foolhardy as his quest for Moby Dick.80 Even were 
he to “get a crucible, and into it, and dissolve [him]self down to one small 
compendious vertebra,” Ahab, to channel Father Mapple, would still be unable to 
“stand[ ] forth his own inexorable self” because his self is inexorably, inextricably 
linked to and dependent on the jouissance that is its extimate, objectal correlative.81 
Hence Zupančič’s characterization of the drive in much the same terms used to 
characterize Fedallah’s extimate nature above, as “a moment of torsion or of 
incurving which might be compared to that of a Möbius strip: if we persist in moving 
on one of its sides, we will suddenly find ourselves on the ‘other’ side.”82 
And this, finally, is why Ahab is perhaps the literary figure to consider in light of 
the new/speculative materialist/realist attempt to both “get out of the subject” and 
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“get the subject out” of ontology — an attempt that has been making considerable 
headway in literary studies of late. To take Bennett’s New Materialism as a case in 
point, in the introduction to Vibrant Matter, Bennett explains that her decision to “elide 
the rich and diverse literature on subjectivity and its genesis, its conditions of 
possibility, and its boundaries” has in large part to do with her belief that “[t]he 
philosophical project of naming where subjectivity begins and ends is too often 
bound up with fantasies of a human uniqueness in the eyes of God, of escape from 
materiality, or of mastery of nature; and even where it is not, it remains an aporetic or 
quixotic endeavor.” To this she adds that it is her “hunch that the image of dead or 
thoroughly instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying 
fantasies of conquest and consumption.”83 It is thus against this thoroughly 
anthropocentric Weltanschauung that Bennett champions a “thing-power” 
materialism, one she hopes will lead to “revisions in operative notions of matter, life, 
self-interest, will, and agency.”84 From the perspective of a Lacanian dialectical 
materialism, however, the beauty of Melville’s self-professed King Ahab is that, 
though he embodies all of these characteristics — the hubris, the self-interest, the 
inveterate will, the fantasies of mastery, conquest, and consumption of nature and all 
its beings — he nonetheless ends up demonstrating the lesson that Hamlet already 
knows: that “The King is a thing.”85 Indeed, for all that has been made of Ahab as 
exemplar of Emersonian self-reliance run amok, of a totalitarian will to power,86 what 
he ultimately exemplifies is the subject not as mega-actant but, to cite one of Žižek’s 
best definitions of the death drive, as “constituted through his own division, splitting, 
as to the object in him,” an object that stands for “the dimension of . . . ‘death drive,’ of 
a traumatic imbalance, a rooting out” that renders “Man as such . . . ‘nature sick unto 
death,’ derailed, run off the rails through fascination with a lethal Thing.”87 Not only 
would one be hard-pressed to formulate a better characterization of Ahab, a man of 
“iron soul” whose “path to [his] fixed purpose is laid with iron rails,” but so too would 
one be hard-pressed to formulate a better answer as to why there can be no “thing-
power,” no vibrant matter, without the subject.88 
To thus finally return to What Is Sex?, what is at stake in this excursion into the 
literary is Zupančič’s fundamental point that, however “fine-sounding” the “self-limiting 
modesty” of theses regarding the “democracy of objects” or the “vibrancy of matter” 
might be, such positions, in eliding or demoting the subject in the name of accessing 
reality “in itself,” “actually (and quite ‘subjectively’) obfuscat[e] reality ‘such as it is’: 
antagonistic,” distorted, excessive.89 If the character of Fedallah, the surplus-
enjoyment (plus-de-jouir) born of the death drive, demonstrates nothing else, it is that 
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“reality appears with an irreducible excess ‘over’ itself,” an excess that renders it 
ontologically incomplete, contradictory, impossible; and this excess is the subject.90 
Hence Zupančič’s conclusion that the lesson of Lacan’s Real ontology — a lesson 
sorely needed today, not only in philosophy, but in literary and cultural studies as well 
— is that “if we cannot think something without a contradiction, we should not take a 
step back from this impossibility (recognizing and accepting it as impossibility, or 
inaccessibility to thought); instead, and on the contrary, we have to take this 
contradiction and impossibility as the very Real which IS accessible to thought.”91 
Above all else, it is this insistence on (the possibility of) thinking the impossible — a 
thinking which, as noted above, constitutes what for Zupančič is the most elementary 
definition of materialism: “thinking which advances as thinking of contradictions” — 
that renders What Is Sex?, especially at this particular moment of return to ontology, 
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